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Abstract: 
Although Marcel and Binswanger are contemporaries both in terms of  
historical period and intellectual pursuit, it is curious that they are never 
discussed together. Hence, this essay will attempt to explore some areas 
of  convergences and divergences between these two intersubjective 
thinkers who are considered to be indispensable interlocutors in the 
I-thou discourse. In this article, as another attempt to take the discourse 
on intersubjectivity a little bit further, Marcel and Binswanger are placed 
in dialogue with the Filipino concept of  loob-kapwa, which the author 
believes provides a hospitable home, when seen against the background 
of  Nicolescu’s “Included Middle”, for the intersubjective relation that 
they are proposing. The author asserts that loob-kapwa tandem, without 
turning a blind eye towards its negative tendencies, is a viable answer 
to the “problem of  crossing-over” that remained to be a philosophical 
baggage for both Marcel and Binswanger courtesy of  their Modern 
upbringing, because the chasm, at least conceptually, is absent in the 
Filipino estimation of  the loob-kapwa intersubjective bond.
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Introduction
Contemporary theology, like in any period of  history, is in search 
for new models and metaphors that appeal to contemporary taste, 
temperament and language. With the remarkable popularity of  postmodern 
thinking in the contemporary world, wherein the importance of  alterity 
and difference has taken the center stage, one is challenged to formulate 
new theological articulations that take into serious consideration the new 
questions that arise from the present pluralistic society and, at the same 
time, recover elements that are essential to theology.  
Thus, in this paper, for the very fi rst time, I propose to bring 
together in a meaningful dialogue on ‘Intersubjectivity’ the following: 
1) Creative Fidelity in the Philosophy of  Existence of  Gabriel Marcel; 
2) Phenomenology of  Love in the Existential Psychology of  Ludwig 
Binswanger; 3) the “Included Middle” in Barasab Nicolescu’s Quantum 
Physics; and 4) the peculiar relationship between the loob and the kapwa as 
construed by some Filipino scholars in the fi elds of  theology, psychology, 
philosophy, anthropology, sociology and management. I argue that the 
Filipino concepts of  loob-kapwa, without disregarding the problematic 
tendencies entrenched in this tandem, provide a viable answer to the 
problem of  bridging the existential chasm between the subject and the 
object that remained to be a philosophical baggage for both Marcel and 
Binswanger courtesy of  their Modern upbringing marked by the radical 
solipsism that originated in Descartes’ discovery of  the “Je suis, J’existe”. 
I believe that with this, a new avenue towards meaningful way of  talking 
about faith in the academy will unfold.
Marcel and Intersubjectivity
To explore Gabriel Marcel’s notion of  Creative Fidelity is not 
an easy task,1 especially because his way of  philosophizing is not so 
straightforward2 manner that one stumbles upon layers and layers of  
confusing but important digressions. Although he is generally categorized 
as an “existential philosopher”, he prefers to be identifi ed as a “believing” 
Catholic, a “neo-Socratic” or a “Christian Socratic” philosopher to set him 
apart from other existentialist philosophers,3 especially Jean Paul Sartre, 
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who have the predilection to characterize the ‘self ’ as an isolated ego,4 to 
“preach” about the death of  God,5 and to project lived experience as having 
‘no exit’.6 Marcel, in contrast to Sartre, spends his philosophical energy by 
refl ecting on themes that have to do with intersubjectivity, the ‘Absolute 
Thou,’ grace, humility, courage, and hope. This is precisely the reason why 
Kenneth Gallagher, an expert on Marcel’s philosophy, has asserted that, 
for Marcel, “authentic human existence is existence-in-communion; it is 
the thou who gives me to myself.”7 For Marcel, the intersubjective “area” is 
located in the horizon of  love.8 
Marcel prefers to dwell in the concrete and lived world rather 
that in the ‘rational life’9, because the latter, for him, is a catalyst for 
human despair.10 In lieu of  the ‘rational’, he proposes a ‘refl ective’ and 
intersubjective journey of  the homo viator.11 For Marcel, it is through 
relationships in the context of  ‘being’ (not in the context of  ‘having’) that 
the love of  the I-thou overcomes death and meaninglessness. A conscious 
effort to overcome ‘death and meaninglessness” is genuinely needed 
because, according to Marcel, the human person has the propensity 
towards materialism and self-destruction.12 This belief, then, leads Marcel 
to profess “to love a being is to say you, you in particular, will never die.” 13
In this logic, Marcel perceives love to be the ‘essential intellectual 
datum’ that is the ground of  hope and immortality.14 Ultimately, for 
Marcel, this intersubjective love is anchored in the fi delity of  the Absolute 
Thou (i.e., Marcel’s way of  naming God) and neither on the I nor on the 
thou whose limitations are an undeniable existential fact,15 The foundation 
of  all communions is the Absolute Thou. In the words of  Hocking, “it is 
God from the beginning who shares all of  our objects and so is the real 
medium of  communication between one person and another.”16 Hence, 
Marcel asserts that the best formulation of  hope in the context of  creative 
fi delity17 is expressed in the appeal, “I hope in thee for us.”18
Binswanger and Intersubjectivity19
It is curious that, although Marcel is a contemporary of  Ludwig 
Binswanger both in terms of  time and academic interest, there is no solid 
proof  that their paths ever crossed.20 Ludwig Binswanger, a psychiatrist 
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by profession, shied away from the reductionistic approach in psychiatry 
popular during his time.  His “new approach” led him to dissociate 
himself  from the tradition of  Freudian psychoanalysis despite their 
“harmonious” professional relationship.21 Likewise, notwithstanding his 
great “admiration” of  Martin Heidegger, he tried to steer away from 
some of  the “problematic” elements found in Heidegger’s philosophy 
whose Dasein was still undoubtedly Cartesian in essence and obsessed 
with death.22 What he tried to develop and promote, instead, was the 
non-reductionistic approach that obviously bears the mark of  Martin 
Buber’s intersubjective I and thou.23 For Binswanger, Heidegger’s Dasein 
was suffering from “schizophrenia” which had torn the Dasein between 
“inauthentic being with others” and the “authentic being alone.”24 In 
contrast to Heidegger’s “schizophrenic” dealing with the Dasein, Binswanger 
proposes Daseinsanalyse or “Existential analysis” which “is an empirical 
science, with its own method and particular idea of  exactness, namely with 
method and ideal of  exactness of  the phenomenological empirical sciences.”25 
Through this, the Dasein is rescued from its tragic solipsism by placing 
it in the context of  what he considered to be a true encounter between 
the self  and the others. Within this horizon, as explained by Roger Frie, 
Binswanger identifi es “the human Dasein is an irreducible duality. Dasein 
in its original form is a ‘we-hood,’ against which the expanse of  existence, 
selfhood and individuality appear as secondary.” 26    Moreover, according 
to Frie, Bin swanger provides a framework within which to understand the 
structure and importance of  reciprocity in a love relation.27 Binswanger 
was convinced that this “loving mode of  being” must be the real objective 
of  any therapist’s relationship with the patient.28 Thus, it can be said that 
his t heory of  intersubjectivity, which locates meaning within the person’s 
relations to self  and others, provided an alternative to Freudian/Lacanian 
psychopathology, Jasperian incomprehensibility (theoretical exclusion of  
psychotic patients from psychological understanding)29 and Heideggerian/
Cartesian/Sartrian individualism via a relational dialogue between the I 
and the thou or the importance of  interpersonal love, which Heidegger 
neglected or eschewed in his theory of  authenticity. Self-realization, for 
Binswanger, can only be attained in the context of  reciprocal relationship 
or within the dialogue between the I and thou.30 For this, he asserted that 
“Man is as much a communal as he us an individual being; he navigates 
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his life back and forth between them.”31 In an earlier work, he stated that 
“Being-in-the-world implies always beings in the world with beings such 
as I, with coexistents.”32 According to Simon Taylor, for Bins wanger 
“Love is thus both the means through which anxiety is overcome, and the 
guiding light in the search for authenticity. If  anxiety represents the ‘loss 
of  world and self,’ love transcends anxiety by grounding human existence 
in what Binswanger terms ‘being-beyond-the-world.’”33 Therefore, for 
Binswanger, “the split of  being into subject (man, person) and object 
(thing, environment) is now replaced by the unity of  existence and ‘world’ 
secure by transcendence.”34
Marcel and Binswanger in Dialogue on Intersubjectivty 
Based on the foregoing discussion, there is indeed a semblance 
between Marcel’s Christian Socratic philosophy of  existence and 
Binswanger’s existentialist psychology despite the fact that they were 
unfamiliar with each other’s intellectual legacy. Both Marcel and 
Binswanger take into serious account the centrality of  Love in concrete 
human life. Marcel, as already mentioned above, believes that love 
overcomes death35 while Binswanger, in the words of  Joeri Schrijvers, 
“considers the experience of  love to be timeless: it can even stand the 
test of  death.”36 Moreover, Binswanger claims that “life without love is 
‘blind,’ and love without life ‘empty’.”37 For Binswanger, as well as for 
Marcel, love overcomes death and meaninglessness. Binswanger, based on 
the analysis of  Schrijvers, gives importance to 
The fullness of  being, revealed through us in love, intimates a ‘being-
beyond-the-world-in-the-world’ (‘über die Welt hinaus sein’) which 
overpowers and empowers the existential structures of  care and concern. 
It does so, moreover, by showing ‘being’ as fundamentally relational or 
intersubjective, for even if  one, in a way, always dies alone, one never 
loves alone as well: it takes two to love – at least.38
Both Marcel and Binswanger struggle against the Cartesian ego that 
inhabits the Heideggerian Dasein by focusing on the messy concrete real 
life situation of  the human beings.39 Marcel adopts what he calls the 
philosophy of  existence that involves “working…up from life to thought 
and then down from thought to life again, so that [one] may try to throw 
more light upon life”40 while Binswanger’s approach is referred to as 
“Daseinanalysis”41 which is “neither ontology nor philosophy proper” but 
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a phenomenological anthropological route that asks the question “what is 
it, for human being, to be.”42 For Marcel, “a philosophy that begins with 
the cogito … runs the risk of  never getting back to being.” 43 Therefore, 
he asserts that as a philosopher, “I am not a spectator who is looking for 
a world of  structures susceptible to being viewed clearly and distinctly, 
but rather I listen to voices and appeals comprising that symphony 
of  Being—which is for me, in the fi nal analysis, a supra-rational unity 
beyond images, words, and concepts.”44 For, indeed, Marcel contends that 
“existence precisely cannot be reduced to objectivity.”45 Binswanger, as 
righty noted by van Deurzen, “considers mutuality, or being-with to be 
fundamental to human existence. Instead of  having to choose between 
Heidegger’s inauthentic being with others or authentic being alone, we 
can redeem ourselves and others through true encounter in Buberian style. 
This encounter, which is a loving mode of  being, is what the therapist 
should aim for with the patient.”46
Both Marcel and Binswanger take seriously the imperfect situation 
of  the human being. Marcel, on his part, calls it the “broken world,”47 
while Binswanger deals with what he calls ‘misglűckten’ (i.e., failed or false 
Dasein). Both the “broken world” and the ‘misglűckten’ when seen from 
the perspective of  or placed in the region of  love reveal the space of  
the ‘WE’ that cannot simply be swept under the rug or denied. Marcel 
claims that a philosopher who dwells in the concrete reality of  life 
cannot escape the moral consequences of  personal involvement that is 
grounded in compassion and responsibility. The philosopher, aware of  the 
‘broken world’, has a moral responsibility vis-à-vis the absurdities and the 
captivities which menace our planet, to reject cynicism and discover those 
depths of  our shared humanness and of  reality which are the sources of  
faith, love, presence and hope. To fulfi ll such an important task, the homo 
viator must constantly return to the “creative tension between the I and 
those depths of  our being in and by which we are.”48 Binswanger, on his 
part, claims that the “Dasein glimpses itself  as Mitdasein.”49 In his critical 
analysis of  Binswanger, Schrijvers reads this statement of  Binswanger as 
an expression of  thought that “there is no one that does not want to be 
loved as much as there is no love for one alone.”50 Furthermore, Schrijvers 
surmises that “Love… for Binswanger unites identity and difference, it 
is the unio as communio: ‘our’ love is the meeting of  you and I with one 
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another, and, through this, a glimpse of  the meeting of  all with all.”51 
Hence, I assume that for both Marcel and Binswanger, the ‘loving we’ is 
an irreducible existential fact.
Another converging point between Marcel and Binswanger is their 
effort to escape the danger of  solitude á deux. Marcel tackles this issue by 
claiming that to love is to experience the presence not only of  the beloved 
but also of  eternity, of  God.52  Moreover, he claims that the fi delity of  the 
I and the Thou is anchored in the virtue of  Hope, wherein the I professes 
its dependence on the Absolute Thou. He states: “Hope… is not only a 
protestation inspired by love, but a sort of  a call too, a desperate appeal to 
an ally who is Himself  also love.”53 Marcel stresses that the real bond that 
links the I and the Thou is based on “something which transcends54 them 
and comprehends them in itself.”55 To state this more clearly, Donald 
McCarthy declares that what develops as
intersubjective love on purely human level is but a shadow of  the I-Thou 
relationship with the Absolute Thou, or a preliminary condition for the 
full establishment through faith. The ontological question, “What am 
I?”, can thus be answered by an Absolute Thou. An ontological need…
shows the need of  a change of  axis…The Absolute Thou is more 
completely within the self  than the self  itself.56
This seems to me as expressing the same point that Binswanger has 
put forward while he endeavors to rescue the ‘lovers’ from the snare of  
solitude á deux. The difference between them, however, lies in the fact that 
Binswanger deliberately avoids having recourse to the Absolute Thou. 
Instead, he pursues the path which leads to the unity and difference that 
the Dasein experiences in the atmosphere of  intersubjectivity. The course 
taken by Binswanger, according to Schrijvers, 
prevents us from reducing the difference of  love to an identity – as when 
one would lose track of  that facticity that I could have loved someone 
else equally – as much as appropriating this identity of  love to such an 
extent that different loves would no longer be possible – the danger 
of  a solitude á deux. Binswanger argues that what reason and rationality 
can barely understand is the fact that in love there is “coinciding of  
this one particular You and You-ness in general [einen  geliebten Du und 
‘Duhaftigkeit überhaupt]”….This means that here this ontic love – for 
you – serves as the particular passageway to the idea of  love, to the love 
that extends to all beings. This love here, in this ontic variety, is extended 
to an ontology of  love, as it extends the greeting to life greeting life, 
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universally. The one Good that you and I share, shares itself  with all and 
everything that can be named ‘good’. This is love’s principle: it cannot 
remain content with you and I alone. 57
It is obvious from the aforementioned “escape routes” provided 
by Marcel and Binswanger, respectively, that the former pursues what 
can be considered as theistic existentialism while the latter argues from 
a non-theistic standpoint. While Marcel, on the one hand, has no qualms 
of  being branded as a Christian Socratic philosopher (being a convert 
to Catholicism), Binswanger, on the other hand, generally dismisses 
religion.58 Perhaps, it is safe to assume that although they come from the 
same context (i.e. from the rubbles of  the world wars) and pursued the 
same path (i.e., existentialism that deals with the concrete life) they arrived 
at two different destinations (i.e., Marcel, the Absolute Thou; Binswanger, 
“ultimately, an affi rmation, a ‘yes’ towards one’s throwness in being with the 
other and others”59).
A Retrieval of  the Pre-Modern LOOB and KAPWA
Identifying the LOOB: A Challenging Journey
Suffi ce it to say that when we talk about loob we are not dealing 
with something that is mono-dimensional, hence, we are trying to dip our 
fi ngers on something that can be considered as very close to home yet 
understandably elusive. As a matter of  fact, Filipino thinkers and scholars 
who have been cracking their heads to identify what is essential to loob 
have, despite their apparent agreement, been divided as to the modality 
of  loob – especially in relation to the kapwa. Thus, we can say that when 
one attempts to investigate on the Filipino concept of  loob, he/she is in 
for a ride. It is certain that in this journey he/she will be greeted with a 
cacophony of  meanings representing the rich and profound dimensions 
of  this indigenous vocabulary. True to its ‘nature’ as a conceptus, indeed, loob 
is undeniably pregnant with meanings,60 which is clearly demonstrated by 
the impressive collection of  idioms rooted in and related to loob with their 
respective attendant signifi cations (i.e., denotations and connotations) 
presented in the book written by Albert Alejo, a well-known philosopher 
and anthropologist in the Philippines, entitled Tao Po! Tuloy! Isang Landas 
ng Pag-unawa sa Loob ng Tao.61 The existence of  surplus meaning as far as 
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the Filipino loob is concerned has defi nitely caught the interest of  scholars 
from different disciplines and cultural orientations to dig deeper into 
the “mystery” of  the Filipino loob. Despite the extensive academic work 
done by these pundits to identify some common threads that run across 
the different layers and facets of  the Filipino loob, the quest for the real 
essence of  loob has never been put to a defi nitive halt. There are some 
elements of  loob on which they generally agree but there are also others 
that continue to evade any fi nal and conclusive unanimity. It is proving to 
be a never-ending saga because, perhaps, it does not only bear the multiple 
cultural baggage harnessed from the past history but also continues to 
pack on new implications as new experiences and circumstances breathe 
new “life” to the Filipino “homo viator”. The concept of  loob is, indeed, a 
part of  the living reality of  every Filipino, just like nakem and buut, which 
will unfl aggingly escape the clutches of  a single monolithic categorization 
that some academics who are infected by the idea clara et distincta62 bug, 
courtesy of  Modernity, have been endeavoring to fi nd. Thus, it is safe to 
say that scholars from all sides of  the intellectual spectrum will continue 
to be fascinated by the over-abundance of  the concept of  loob.
Having said all that, I argue that the Filipino concept of  loob does 
not only bear some semblance to the ‘self ’ as respectively understood 
by Marcel and Binswanger, but also enriches the ongoing discourse on 
intersubjectivity because this concept, taken in its pre-modern signifi cation, 
underlines or brings to the fore some relational components that may either 
be latent or absent in Marcel’s and Binswanger’s intellectual undertakings. 
Perhaps, the Filipino loob, as understood by some of  the Filipino scholars 
who have tried to mine its intersubjective treasure, will ‘heal’ the ‘wound 
of  existential division’ created in the West and in westernized society, 
including the Philippines, by Descartes’ Cogito.
 The concept the Filipino loob can be used in either literal or personal 
sense. The ‘literal’ pertains to the spatial or physical meaning of  the word 
loob ; what is literally inside or the ‘inside’ itself.63 The use of  the word is 
self-evident enough for one to catch its sense immediately. According to 
Leonardo Mercado, the conceptual equivalent of  this in Visayan is sulud 
and in Ilocano is uneg/loob.64
When the word is used in its ‘personal’ sense or is applied to the loob 
of  the person, however, the issue becomes messier or more complicated. 
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Loob, as explained by Mercado, can understood as “sarili” just like the 
Visayan buut or Ilakano nakem which bears the notion of  ‘selfhood’.65 But, 
loob is not just sarili because according to Mercado, loob is specifi cally the 
dimension of  the self  that embodies the “essence” of  the Filipino ‘cosmic 
self ’.66 Loob, as a ‘holistic’67 and ‘cosmic’ concept, cannot be conceived in a 
compartmentalized way of  thinking of  the West because the Filipino loob 
encompasses the aspects of  feeling, thinking and willing.68 It is generally 
agreed, according to Mercado, that “[the] Filipino looks at, himself  as a 
self, as one who feels, as one who wills, as one who thinks, as one who 
acts: as a total whole-as a ‘person,’ conscious of  his freedom, proud of  his 
human dignity, and sensitive to the violation of  these two.”69 
Aside from being characterized as ‘holistic’, Mercado argues that 
loob also pertains to a person’s ‘interiority,’ which is generally accepted by 
most Filipino scholars.70 “Loób,” according to Vicente Rafael, “is at the root 
of  one of  the words for – to give, ipagcaloób, and a gift itself  is caloób, literally 
part of  the inside of  something. Thus inside is juxtaposed rather than 
dialectically opposed to outside.”71 Albert Alejo, however, underscores that 
“loób…cannot be encased only in a simplistic division between loób and 
labas.”72 Jeremiah Reyes, in contrast to the general agreement on the loob as 
interiority, proposes a way of  avoiding the pitfall of  presenting loob as an 
‘inner self ’”. For him, it is more proper to understand loob not just a ‘will’ 
but as a ‘relational will’,73 which clearly indicates the very important ‘milieu’ 
of  relationality where the loob is ontologically situated. It is imperative, 
according to Reyes, “to distance loob from the modern conceptions of  the 
will, such as the autonomous and self-legislating will found in Kant.”74 
‘Autonomy’ or being an ‘isolated monad’, Reyes contends, is something 
that is foreign to the Filipino concept of  loob, especially in its pre-modern 
or pre-colonial sense. Loob does not share the notion of  the Cartesian 
res cogitans that is imprisoned in its monadic cell of  solipsism. Because 
of  this, Reyes avers that “[the] confusion starts when people latch on to 
[the] literal translation of  loόb as ‘inside’ and use all sorts of  twentieth-
century Western philosophical and psychological theories to explain loόb 
with the subjective-objective dichotomy of  Descartes or Kant looming in 
the background.”75 
Although I am inclined to agree with Reyes in this respect, I 
believe that this ‘confusion’ will be a perennial problem should we insist 
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on using this Tagalog word which obviously shares the same exact word 
with the ‘loob’ that we ordinarily use to refer to spatial or physical interiority, 
which, as I have already discussed earlier, is not carried by the Ilocano 
word ‘nakem’76 and the Bicolano/Visayan word ‘buot’ because these two 
regional linguistic families have different terminologies used to refer to 
physical interiority. Thus, it begs the question: Can we not just accept the 
notion of  ‘interiority’ as indispensable aspect of  the concept of  Tagalog 
loob and never attempt at limiting loob purely or absolutely to the notion 
of  “interior-less” ‘will’ alone? Perhaps, this is the reason why even if  
Leonardo Mercado strongly rejects the use of  “either/or” category when 
referring to the Filipino notion of  loob because it is located within the 
realm of  ‘holism’ or of  the ‘both/and’, 77 Miranda and Prospero Covar 
do not do away also with the idea of  com-penetration of  the inside and the 
outside.78 Alejo’s explanation of  the concept of  loob can be seen as a 
possible support to the argument of  maintaining the notion of  interiority 
in the Filipino loob because, according to him 
The loób is not only the combination of  the lawak (breadth) and lalim 
(depth) of  the walls, fl oors, and eaves of  a room but the laman (content) 
which are gathered in the center and that which moves from the center 
unto the corner and out into the front. Loób is also the surroundings that 
is composed of  the sounds which are heard by the one who is knocking 
and not invading. The loób is that which is felt even in its silence which is 
understood when someone understands and shares that loób.79 
This argument of  Alejo, for me, conveys the same point expressed in 
Marcel’s and Binswanger’s notion of  the ‘self ’ which cannot be reduced 
to a disembodied Cartesian subject. The loob is a concretely embodied self  
that “is and will always be directed towards something, especially towards 
other people.”80 It should never be treated in isolation like an ‘object’ 
plucked out from its normal habitat because it is essentially immersed in a 
relational milieu or, “completely embedded and integrated inside the web 
of  connectivity.”81 
In this web of  connectivity, Jose de Mesa retains the importance 
of  the core of  personhood which is the loob. He succinctly explains that “Loób 
apart from referring to the core of  personhood, also states what kind of  
core that is in relationship. Loób, one may say, is a relational understanding 
of  the person in the lowland Filipino context.”82 Miranda, on his part, 
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affi rms that “Loob needs kapwa even to be loob: its continued responding 
to kapwa is the condition for its own existence and authenticity as loob.”83 It 
is meaningless, therefore to investigate the concept of  loob (i.e., something 
about the ‘will’ of  a person) like a monad which is detached or isolated 
from its organic relation to the kapwa and to the values and virtues that 
emanate from this ‘tandem’.
What is ‘Inside’? Loob as Potentia 
Reyes suggests that a more proper way of  understanding of  the 
pre-modern Filipino loob is through the prism of  Thomistic Virtue Ethics 
rather than simply looking at it from the lens of  a Cultural Value. With 
this approach, according to him, one can rescue the concept of  loob from 
the notion of  shallow subjectivism or of  a fl eeting personal preference.84 
Using “Aquinas’ metaphysical doctrine of  potency and act”, Reyes offers 
a corrective lens to explain how the notion of  ‘inside’ can still be applied 
to the Filipino concept of  loob which does not imply ‘interiority’ found in 
the modern subject.85 ‘Inside’, according to Reyes, must be understood 
in the context of  the Filipino loob as potentia (potency) like in the idea of  
a tree being “inside” the seed or the statue of  David being “inside” the 
block of  marble. In this logic, we can say that what has “always” been 
“inside” (i.e., hidden) was brought “outside” (i.e., actualized) by natural 
process of  growth in the case of  the tree and by the intervention of  the 
sculptor in the case of  the statue of  David.86 For Reyes, the loob of  the 
person is more deeply understood not ‘through refl ection” but “by living 
in relationship with others” which embodies the essence of  what Karol 
Wojtyla had expressed in the following words: “Action reveals the person… 
Action gives us the best insight into the inherent essence of  the person 
and allows us to understand the person most fully.”87
 To borrow the words of  Miranda, “Loob comes to be through its 
activity; without such activity loob is not; it does not exist.”88 Thus, I can 
posit that the actualization of  loob, whether it becomes a virtue like in the 
case of  the kagandahang loob (i.e., benevolent will) or a vice like in the case 
of  masamang loob (i.e., ill will) will certainly be infl uenced by the how and 
the where it is being nurtured and played out – whether in a hospitable or 
hostile environment, positive or negative, in an atmosphere of  love or 
hate, harmony or divisiveness. Indeed, Reyes is right in saying that “the 
loób is known only through relationship and interaction. Even your own loób 
252
cannot be determined by yourself  in isolation, instead it is determined 
by how you relate and act towards your kapwa.”89 Thus, the virtuous loob 
can be actualized in the healthy relational environment that includes the 
presence of  the kapwa. This means that when the atmosphere is not 
conducive for cultivating virtues, the vicious loob gains the upper hand. 
The loob becomes a threat to the kapwa. The loob instead of  fostering a 
loving relationship together with the kapwa becomes an instrument of  
division and destruction. Indeed, situations of  alienation, tension and 
destruction creep in in the context of  this intimate relationship which 
may water down or dissolve the bond that bring the loob and kapwa into 
a harmonious togetherness. One cannot simply turn a blind eye towards 
the “negative tendencies” that arise in this “loving” relationship. Despite 
being animated by the spirit of  ‘intimacy and harmony’, they are still 
capable of  harboring hatred and infl icting injury, suffering and death upon 
others, even to family members whom they consider as the core of  their 
beings. The profound value they attach to relationship is certainly not 
a hundred percent guarantee that confl ictual relationships are not sown 
by the loob in the fi eld of  intersubjectivity that could lead to bloody and 
deadly encounters.
Kapwa’s Role in the Web of  Relationality: The other side of  the relational coin? 
 An understanding of  the concept of  loob is gravely defi cient if  it 
is not viewed in tandem with another Filipino indigenous concept, which 
is the kapwa. In its literal sense, kapwa can either mean ‘fellow’ or ‘both’, 
which may express the notions of  “sameness and relational-ness”.90 
Beyond its literal sense, however, kapwa is understood as “the core of  
Filipino personhood… the notion of  a ‘shared self ’ [which’ extends to the 
I to include the Other,” according to Katrin de Guia..91 Kapwa, as a ‘shared 
self ’, in the words of  De Guia, “bridges the deepest individual recess 
of  a person with anyone outside him or herself, even total strangers.”92 
Enriquez, who has held almost the same cogitation of  kapwa as de Guia, 
explains that
When asked for the closest English equivalent of  kapwa, one word that 
comes to mind is the English word ‘others.’ However, the Filipino word 
kapwa is very different from the English word ‘others.’ In Filipino, kapwa 
is the unity of  the ‘self ’ and ‘others.’ The English ‘others’ is actually used 
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in opposition to the ‘self,’ and implies the recognition of  the self  as a 
separate identity. In contrast, kapwa is a recognition of  shared identity, 
an inner self  shared with others.93 
Furthermore, he expounds that, indeed, the notion of  intimacy is 
incumbent to relation of  the loob and kapwa because “[the] ako (ego) and 
the iba-sa-akin (others) are one and the same in kapwa psychology: Hindi 
ako iba sa aking kapwa (I am no different from others). Once ako starts 
thinking of  himself  as separate from kapwa, the Filipino ‘self ’ gets to be 
individuated in the Western sense and, in effect, denies the status of  kapwa 
to the other. By the same token, the status of  kapwa is also denied to the 
self.” 94
 Reyes suggests that kapwa is best translated in English as “together 
with the person”95 because it is meaningless to defi ne kapwa on its own. 
For Reyes, there can be no other “starting point for kapwa” except in 
the context of  ‘togetherness’.96 This brings to mind Ferriols who has 
beautifully captured this notion of  intersubjectivity or togetherness in 
Tagalog: “nakikipagkapwa ang kalooban at kalooban.”97 It is so primordial 
that before one conceives of  the unique identities of  the loob and kapwa 
respectively, one experiences fi rst and foremost the intimate bond shared 
by the self  and the other.
  At face value, it can be said that the Tagalog concept of  kapwa 
bears some semblance to Levinas’ l’autre or the Du in Buber. Exploring 
further than this skin-deep analogy, however, reveals that there are some 
attendant ideas that are not shared in common by these three relational 
concepts, but are individually held by each one. While Levinas’ ‘Other’ is 
considered to be ‘infi nitely different’ from the ‘self ’, the Filipino kapwa, 
according to Reyes, is a being that is intimately tied to and profoundly 
known by the loob or self. 98 Thus, unlike the loob-kapwa tandem that is 
“defi ned” by the intimate link they share with one another, the ‘self ’ and 
the ‘l’autre’ is separated by the insurmountable chasm between them. This 
is also true for Martin Buber’s Du, although it is seen as a “milder” version 
of  Levinas’ l’autre. According to Guevara, “Martin Buber basically agrees 
with Levinas in that the other is irreducible to any categories of  thought 
set up by the ego. Buber recognizes the other’s way of  authentic existence 
as essentially different from the self.”99 Reyes, therefore, contends that 
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“for kapwa relationship is the given, it is taken for granted. It is the starting 
point, not something to be retrieved.”100
What resembles kapwa more, Reyes opines, is the ‘communio 
personarum’101 that both Norris Clarke102 and Karol Wojtyla have expressed 
in their respective philosophical treatises. This is so, because Norris Clarke, 
as per evaluation of  Reyes, continues of  the legacy of  Thomas Aquinas 
philosophy that sees being or the human person as “substance -in-relation”.103 
But Clarke, taking the discourse further, claims that “To be an authentic 
person, in a word, is to be a lover, to live a life of  inter-personal self-giving 
and receiving. Person is essentially a ‘we’ term. Person exists in its fullness 
only in the plural.”104 Wojtyla, on his part, understands the ‘we’ relationship 
as ‘participation’.105 What seems to be a problem in Wojtyla’s notion of  
participation is the “strong emphasis” he has given to the “subjective ‘I’” 
which does not sit well with the Filipino notion of  loob-kapwa.106
Speaking of  which, I fi nd Barasab Nicolescu’s notion of  the 
“included middle” particularly enlightening. Although this concept stems 
from the region of  quantum physics, it can instruct us not only in the 
area of  transdisciplinarity but also in our understanding of  the peculiar 
relationship between the loob-kapwa. Nicolescu notes that transdisciplinary, 
as an approach, deals with a reality whose realm is multi-dimensional yet 
coherent, wherein the level of  non-contradiction (i.e., T-state) can co-exist 
with a level of  contradiction (i.e., A and non-A). With this explanation, 
we learn from Nicolescu that the “included middle” expresses non-
contradictoriness or mutual inclusivity wherein the notions of  “true” and 
“false” are expanded “in such a way that the rules of  logical implication 
no longer concerning two terms (A and non-A) but three terms (A, non-A 
and T), co-existing at the same moment in time… The logic of  the included 
middle is the privileged logic of  complexity, privileged in the sense that it allows 
us to cross the different areas of  knowledge in a coherent way, by enabling 
a new kind of  simplicity.”107
This does not imply, however, that the opposite (i.e., “logic of  
excluded middle”) is categorically denied or taken out of  the picture. 
Instead, what happens is a narrowing down of  the validity of  the scope 
which “the logic of  the excluded middle” traditionally held. This means 
to say that “the logic of  the excluded middle” cannot be applied in all 
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circumstances since it is only valid, according to Nicolescu, “for relatively 
simple situation”.108 He contends that when “the logic of  excluded 
middle” is absolutized and universalized, it becomes harmful, especially 
when placed in the “complex” and “transdisciplinary cases”.109
On this note,  I believe that it is possible to understand the peculiar 
relationship of  loob-kapwa from the prism of  the ‘included middle’, because 
in this relationship, as understood by most of  the Filipino scholars which 
we will explain in more detail later on, the loob and the kapwa are not 
identical but at the same time they are intimately linked to one another 
– they are physically seen as separate or discrete entities but on another 
level, the realm of  relationality, they are construed or experienced as 
united. Thus, while it affi rms the logic A is not equal to –A, because their 
apparent distinctness, it does not negate their complex togetherness, that 
is, the loob and the kapwa can contemporaneously reside or harmoniously 
co-exist in each person, without also denying that they are two different 
entities. This unique loob-kapwa relationship can also be translated to how, 
as far as traditional Filipino consciousness is concerned, the confl uence 
of  the spirit and the human worlds. This explains why within the Filipino 
worldview there is an intimate link between the sacred and the profane as 
well as the closeness of  the human and the divine, which is unfortunately 
mistakenly labeled as split-level Christianity by Bulatao.110
Marcel and Binswanger Finding a “Homeland” in the Filipino 
Loob?
Seeing the closeness between Binswanger’s and Marcel’s notions 
of  communion, notwithstanding their differences, I also perceive a 
possible converging point between them and the Filipino concept of  “loob” 
(relational will) that is intimately linked with the “kapwa” (together with the 
person) as understood by Reyes. Although the “twin” concepts of  loob and 
kapwa are a peculiar result of  the fusion of  Southeast Asian tribal-animist 
Filipino and Spanish Catholic traditions, I believe that the united forces 
of  Binswanger, Marcel and the Filipino loob can prove that the Cartesian 
solipsistic ego, carried over by Heidegger’s Dasein, is not the irreducible 
existential fact. In other words, the solipsistic ego is untenable. This ‘trio’ 
strongly affi rms that the real ontological factum is the togetherness of  the 
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I-thou and not Descartes’ “I think I am” or Heidegger’s “I am dying.” 
Binswanger and Marcel both locate this togetherness in the realm of  love: 
Binswanger proposes that love is an experience of  unity and infi nity and 
Marcel posits that when one says “I love you” he/she is also saying “You 
shall not die.”
These western articulations of  love, in my opinion, can fi nd a 
hospitable home in the Filipino “loob-kapwa” tandem as I have demonstrated 
earlier using the philosophical proposals of  Reyes, Miranda, Mercado and 
the like, because the very essence of  these concepts (i.e., loob as a relational 
will and kapwa as together with the person), when actualized by the players 
in the fi eld of  intersubjectivity, will weather any destructive bifurcation 
thrown into the path of  loob-kapwa by the Modern way of  thinking rooted 
in the solipsistic Cartesian ego. The loob-kapwa is a strong affi rmation of  
intersubjectivity and communion.111 That is why, according to Dionisio 
Miranda, “Loob needs kapwa even to be loob: its continued responding to 
the kapwa is the condition for its own existence and its authenticity as 
loob.”112 In other words, the absence of  the kapwa renders the self  or the 
loob inauthentic. 
In the language of  Binswanger, it is called ‘being-together-at-
home-in-the-world.’ Marcel refers to this as the “mystery of  communion” 
located in the “being-in-situation”. Conceptually, as I have already 
explained earlier, there is no dichotomy between what is within and without 
in the Filipino understanding of  loob. Loob, which is not perceived as a 
disembodied self, is always directed at something or someone. According 
to Reyes, “Loob is only what it is in so far as it is completely embedded 
and integrated inside the web of  connectivity.”113 A person seen against 
the background of  the Filipino worldview cannot be a genuine person 
without his/her recognition of  one’s shared identity or of  what di Guia 
referred to as ‘people-centered orientation’114 Moreover, the Filipino 
kapwa, as earlier indicated, is not similar to the English concept of  ‘others’ 
which is diametrically opposed to the ‘self ’. Therefore, the Filipino loob-
kapwa, in its ‘ordinary’ sense, retains the primordial unity of  the I and the 
thou. For, indeed, in kapwa, as I have already quoted earlier from Reyes, 
“relationship is the given. It is taken for granted. It is the starting point, 
not something to be retrieved.”115
R. Rebustillo: New Look at Intersubjectivity and Theology
257
Melintas Vol. 33, No. 3, 2017
This is the reason why the fullness of  personhood (what is 
considered in the West as self-realization) is found in the Filipino 
expression of  pagkakaisa (oneness), which according to Enriquez is the 
“highest level of  interpersonal interaction possible… a full realization 
of  pakikipagkapwa.”116 Hence, the twin commandments found in the 
Scriptures that express love for God and love for neighbor as oneself  is 
not signifi cantly alien to the Filipino person. It is the very context of  his/
her existence, which perhaps explains the religiosity of  the Filipinos.
It is interesting to note, at this point, that the Filipino kapwa is 
ambivalent in terms of  number. It does not reveal immediately (unlike the 
words I, self  and other) whether it pertains to just one or many. It can be 
singular or plural. It is also true even in the concept of  kapwa. Therefore, 
there is an inherent openness to other others. It does not allow itself  
to be trapped in solitude á deux. Naturally, it does not require an escape 
route needed by Marcel and Binswanger in their respective intersubjective 
journeys.
Aside from this, the Filipino loob, unlike Marcel who starts from the 
‘broken world’ and Binswanger who begins with the misglűckten, is situated 
in a primordial harmonious diversity.117 Thus, it is already immersed in 
what Binswanger considers as unity of  identity and difference and in what 
Marcel calls as creative tension in the mystery of  being.
I feel, however, that the Filipino loob-kapwa lies closer to Marcel 
than to Binswanger, because of  its openness to the Transcendent, to the 
Divine. The kapwa of  the loob is not only limited to the human entities but is 
also extended to the spiritual entities that ordinarily inhabit the traditional 
Filipino worldview.118 Thus, the Filipino loob is predisposed to an encounter 
with the Absolute Thou that Marcel discovers in his pilgrimage to the 
mystery of  being. In fact, for a Filipino person, the interpenetration of  
the divine, human person and other/s is already a given. It is the starting 
point. It is also the end-point.
Beyond this comparative work that I have done concerning 
Marcel, Binswanger, and the Filipino loob-kapwa which is mostly derived 
from the philosophical exploration of  Jeremiah Reyes, there is another 
philosophical or theological avenue that can be pursued. This theological 
trail which has already been initially blazed by Jose de Mesa and Levy Lara 
Lanaria endeavors to establish a conceptual link between the Filipino loob-
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kapwa tandem and the mystery of  the Christian Trinitarian God – a unity 
in diversity. 
  Jose de Mesa, has introduced into the ongoing theological 
discourse on inculturation the possibility of  using loob as a platform for 
providing a glimpse of  the mystery of  God’s love through the native 
expression kagandahang-loob.119 This “culturally appropriate category” can 
be dynamically translated to English as “winsome benevolence of  God” 
that brings together into a creative blend the notions of  beauty, goodness 
and will. This concept of  kagandahang-loob, according to de Mesa, will make 
the mystery of  God’s love more comprehensible to ordinary Filipino 
faithful whose worldview conceptually grasps the meaning of  loob as “the 
inner self... the core of  one’s personhood and where the true worth of  
a person lies”. 120 Coupled with the notions of  “beauty and goodness”, 
kagandahang-loob reveals also the Christian God, whose fullness of  
revelation comes in the Person of  Jesus Christ, the kagandahang-loob par 
excellence, the pure goodness which is, according to de Mesa as quoted by 
Bevans in Theology in Global Perspective, “not cold, but warm, a kindness 
which is not enslaving, but liberating.”121 This kagandahang-loob, for Albert 
Alejo, is similar to the notion of  kabaitan which also means benevolence 
or “kabutihang walang daya” (i.e., “goodness without deceit”).122 Looking at 
it from the perspective of  the Filipino loob-kapwa, it is possible to see God 
who is the Omnipotent Creator and the perfection of  kagandahang-loob as 
the very well-spring of  the loob of  the human person who is continuously 
being sustained and inspired by this Absolute Source (i.e., God) so that 
the human person will actualize his/her kagandandahang-loob that refl ects 
God’s image and likeness. And this God who is pure kagandahang-loob never 
ceases to invite people to constantly remain in the loving and life-giving 
relationship with God as a manifestation of  kagandahang-loob. Outside this 
relation, love defi nitely fades and life certainly perishes.
 The idea that God indefatigably offers to the human person an 
invitation to enter into the mystery of  communion shared by the Three 
Divine Persons with each other, is also the very basis for Levy Lara Lanaria’s 
theological proposal to refl ect on how the Bible, especially in the Book of  
Genesis, reveals “a relational God-within” who has/have projected to or 
implanted in the human persons the relational bond of  the loob-kapwa.123 
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The One True God that we have, according to him, is not a lonely and 
isolated God but a God who is a loving community, a God whose “loob is 
essentially an intra-relational self ” – a ‘Trinity’. By uttering the words “let 
us make the human person according to our image and likeness (Gen. 2:7),” 
God reveals God’s intention of  making communion (unity in diversity) as 
the raison d’ètre of  every human being. This becomes clearly demonstrated 
in what the Filipinos consider as the value of  pakikipagkapwa which is 
practiced mostly by the members of  biological families and ecclesial 
communities. In other words, these human relations mirror a faint but 
genuine image of  the Trinitarian God who is ‘the’ most real Loob-Kapwa or 
the Pakikipagkapwa par excellence.124 In this framework, we understand that 
the dynamics of  “intra-relationships” that transpires within God’s loob is, 
thereby, lovingly and freely shared (mapagmahal at malayang ipinagkakaloob) 
by God to God’s created beings (i.e., human-beings).125 This, I believe, is 
also the meaning of  Immanuel - the God with us, the God who will not 
abandon us even if  a mother forgets her child – because God’s Divine 
Loob is already embedded in the loob of  the human persons. God’s Loob is 
perceived by Filipinos as being intimately married into our loob as human 
beings, that is why, generally, Filipinos do not have a problem in declaring 
their profound trust in the kalooban ng Diyos (God’s will) because the 
innermost depth of  our being (kaloob-looban) is believed to conform to the 
Loob of  God. Indeed, as far as Filipino religious worldview is concerned, 
our innermost being simply echoes what is “in the heart” of  God: God’s 
kalooban (God’s will) is ultimately our kalooban (the human person’s will) 
when we listen carefully and truthfully to what the deepest core of  our 
being is telling us. Filipinos, in general, believe that God’s kalooban is not 
capable of  harming the human beings who are created in the God’s image 
and likeness. The human beings are, indeed, the loob who are the kapwa 
of  God who is the perfection of  Loob-Kapwa community. The challenge, 
therefore, is for the human beings to strive to constantly be attuned to 
God’s Divine Loob in order for them not to lose sight of  their real purpose 
in life which is to be a communion of  persons who respect, love and 
support each other as they journey together towards the common goal 
of  communal, as well as individual, self-actualization. Speaking more 
specifi cally about the relationship between the Trinity and the community 
of  God’s creatures, Lanaria says that 
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The Christian theological tradition has given names to the three-in-
one God: Father, Son and Spirit. Within the innermost Triune loob is 
a dynamic interaction of  coequal persons in perfect unity. Christians 
normally commune with the Triune God through Jesus Christ the one 
mediator between God and humankind…If  God is kagandahang-loob 
(winsome benevolence; love), then Jesus Christ…is God’s kagandahang-
loob. To be united with the Triune God is to be united with and through 
Jesus Christ-God who had ‘gone down’ from the Spirit world and 
became our kapwa-in-corporeality. The union with Jesus…’is an intrinsic 
one, based on an ontological reality’ wherein he “communicates his 
life, his being to (them) from an innermost dwelling place within (their) 
being” thus enabling them to be animated by his Spirit and to live in 
him.126 
 Thus, I argue that the Filipino indigenous concept of  loob-kapwa 
does not only enrich Marcel’s and Binswanger’s respective notions of  
intersubjectivity because it tries to underpin the intimate relationship that 
binds the self  and the other which was greatly affl icted by the establishment 
of  the Cartesian ego, but at the same time, it provides a stepping stone 
towards an assent to the Trinitarian God who is the loob-kapwa par excellence 
– a unity in diversity, A Divine Being who is Three Persons in one God.
Triangulation of  Marcel, Binswanger and Loob: A Possible 
Response to the Challenge of  Contemporary Theology
To conclude, despite the divergences that we discover between 
Marcel, Binswanger and the Filipino loob as expressed mostly by Reyes, 
it can still be asserted that these three will defi nitely be at home with 
each other. The convergence that we fi nd in them, I believe, helps one to 
confront the issue of  theology in the context of  the postmodern world. 
Enlightened by them, I am given some pointers on how to do theology 
in the midst of  multiplicity and alterity – taking advantage of  the richness 
of  intersubjectivity and interreligious/ecumenical/non-denominational 
dialogues, because existence is co-existence and theology is better done in 
the encounter of  multiplicity and alterity. It is a multiplicity in the context 
of  communion. It is alterity that is rooted in relationship. Personally, the 
combination of  Marcel, Binswanger and the Filipino loob allows me to 
have a glimpse of  the reality of  the Trinitarian God who is a unity of  identity 
and difference, a mysterious community of  creative tension, and a relational will who 
is at the same time together with the person.
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1 For Gabriel Marcel, to exist existentially means to exist not simply as a body (i.e., 
to exist problematically) but to exist as a thinking, emotive being dependent upon 
human creative impulse. He asserts, “As soon as there is creation, we are in the realm 
of  being,” and also that, “There is no sense using the word ‘being’ except where 
creation is in view”. Gabriel Marcel, “Les Menace de Guerre,” eds. Joël Bouëssée 
and Anne Marcel, in Gabriel Marcel Et les injustices de ce Temps: La Responsabilite du 
Philosophe, Presence de Gabriel Marcel, cahier 4 (Paris: Aubier, 1983) xiii. Cf  also 
James Fieser and Bradley Dowden, eds., “Gabriel Marcel (1889—1973),” Internet 
Encyclopedia of  Philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.edu/marcel/ [accessed December 22, 
2014].Cf. also Gabriel Marcel, Creative Fidelity, trans. and intro. Robert Rosthal (New 
York: Fordham University, 2002) 136.
2 He is a decidedly unsystematic thinker.
3 According to Internet Encyclopedia of  Philosophy, “The philosophical approach 
known as existentialism is commonly recognized for its view that life’s experiences 
and interactions are meaningless. Many existentialist thinkers are led to conclude 
that life is only something to be tolerated, and that close or intimate relationships 
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with others should be avoided.” Fieser and Dowden, “Gabriel Marcel”.
4 Commitment, for Sartre, is “based on the strength of  the solitary decisions made by 
individuals who have committed themselves fully to personal independence”. Fieser 
and Dowden, “Gabriel Marcel”.
5 Nigel Warburton explains that “For Sartre ‘abandonment’ means specifi cally 
abandonment by God. This does not imply that God as a metaphysical entity 
actually existed at some point, and went away: Sartre is echoing Nietzsche’s famous 
pronouncement: ‘God is dead’. Nietzsche did not mean that God had once been 
alive, but rather that the belief  in God was no longer a tenable position in the late 
nineteenth century. By using the word ‘abandonment’ in a metaphorical way Sartre 
emphasizes the sense of  loss caused by the realization that there is no God to 
warrant our moral choices, no divinity to give us guidelines as to how to achieve 
salvation. The choice of  word stresses the solitary position of  human beings alone 
in the universe with no external source of  objective value.” Nigel Warburton, 
“A Student’s Guide to Jean-Paul Sartre’s, Existentialism and Humanism,” Philosophy 
Now 15 (1996):27-31, https://philosophynow.org/issues/15/A_students_guide_
to_Jean-Paul_Sartres_Existentialism_and_Humanism [accessed December 23, 
2014].
6  Warburton explains that “Despair, like abandonment and anguish, is an emotive 
term. Sartre means by it simply the existentialist’s attitude to the recalcitrance or 
obstinacy of  the aspects of  the world that are beyond our control (and in particular 
other people: in his play No Exit one of  the characters declares ‘Hell is other 
people’). Whatever I desire to do, other people or external events may thwart. The 
attitude of  despair is one of  stoic indifference to the way things turn out: “When 
Descartes said ‘Conquer yourself  rather than the world’, what he meant was, at 
bottom, the same – that we should act without hope.” Warburton, “A Student’s 
Guide’” 39. We cannot rely on anything which is outside our control, but this does 
not mean we should abandon ourselves to inaction: on the contrary, Sartre argues 
that it should lead us to commit ourselves to a course of  action since there is no 
reality except in action. As Sartre puts it: ‘The genius of  Proust is the totality of  the 
works of  Proust.’ (pp.41-2) – everyone is wholly defi ned by what they actually do 
rather than by what they might have done had circumstances been different. For 
Sartre there are no ‘mute inglorious Miltons.’” Warburton, “A Student’s Guide.”
7 Kenneth Gallagher, The Philosophy of  Gabriel Marcel (New York: Fordham University, 
1975) 8.
8 Cf. Joe McCown, Availability: Gabriel Marcel and the Phenomenology of  Human Openness: 
AAR Studies in Religion (Montana: Scholars, 1978) 44.
9 According to Gabriel Marcel, “Philosophy will always… be an aid to discovery 
rather than a matter of  strict demonstration.” Gabriel Marcel, Le Mystere de l’ Etre, 
vol. 1, Refl exion et Myster (Paris: Editions Montaigne, 1951) 2. Roque Ferriols, on 
his part, says in Tagalog: Kaya’t ang importante ay dumanas, magmasid, kumilatis: isang 
mapagdamang pag-aapuhap sa talagang meron. Hindi na ngayon kagandahan ng sariling isip, 
kundi kabagsikan ng hindi ko ginawa ang umiiral sa kalooban ko, at pumapaligid at tumatalab 
sa akin. Iyan ang unang yugto sa pagbigkas sa meron.”It is diffi cult to translate these 
words to English, but essentially what Ferriols would like to say is that in order 
for one to properly philosophize, must immerse oneself  in the concrete realities 
of  life to experience, observe and asses what being is. Groping for what being is 
involves all the senses of  the human being. It is not about the brilliance of  one’s 
mind, but about the fi erceness of  what exists, surrounds and impinges on me that 
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ganito, ginagamit ang mga konsepto; ngunit, sapagkat ang paghihilig sa meron ang nagpapairal 
sa pagdanas, pagmasid at pangingilatis, hindi konsepto ang hari, kundi meron…. Ang konsepto 
ay kailangang maging angkop: angkop sa meron. At kung hindi angkop ay kailangang itaboy 
at palitan ng angkop sa meron.” ( In this quest one makes use of  concepts; however, 
because one’s “inclination’ to being is what gives dynamism to experiencing, 
observing and assessing, concepts are not kings, but being…. A concept must 
conform to what is being. And when it does not, it simply must be discarded and be 
replaced by a new one.) Ferriols, Pambungad sa Metapisika, 112. 
10 Gabriel Marcel, Awakenings, trans. Peter Rogers (Milwaukee: Marquette University, 
2002) 131.
11 Marcel pictures himself  as a philosopher in search of  a concrete philosophy 
characterized by mystery, being, love, faith incarnation, communion, transcendence, 
availability and hope whose philosophical journey/pilgrimage has no end but only 
a beginning. Marcel, Gabriel. Concrete Philosophy of  Marcel is more of  a voyage 
of  discovery rather than a series of  logical, epistemological, and metaphysical 
arguments. Gabriel Marcel, Homo Viator: Introduction to a Metaphysic of  Hope, trans. 
Emma Craufurd (Chicago: Harper & Row, 1965).
12 Cf. Gabriel Marcel, Man Against Mass Society, trans. G.S. Fraser (Chicago: Henry 
Regnery, 1962).
13 Marcel, Homo Viator, 140.
14 Cf. Gabriel Marcel, Problematic Man, trans. Brian Thompson (New York: Herder and 
Herder, 1967).
15 Marcel claims that “all spiritual life is essentially a dialogue,” which according to him 
means, “the relationship that can be said to be spiritual is that of  being with being… 
What really matters is spiritual commerce between beings, and that involves not 
respect but love.” Gabriel Marcel, Metaphysical Journal, trans. Bernard Wall (Chicago, 
IL: Regnery, 1952; London: Rockliff, 1952) 137 and 211.
16 From a letter written by Hocking in 1920. Cited in Leroy J. Rouner, Within Human 
Experience: The Philosophy of  William Ernest Hocking (New York: Harvard University, 
1969) 41.
17 Marcel states: “It must therefore be well understood that the faithful soul is destined 
to experience darkness…Fidelity is not a preliminary datum, it is revealed and 
established as fi delity by this very crossing of  darkness, by this trial combined with 
everyday life.” Marcel, Homo Viator, 140.
18 Marcel, Homo Viator, 60.
19 My knowledge on Binswanger is considerably dependent on Schrijvers’ texts used in 
a doctoral seminar at the Faculty of  Theology of  KU Leuven – Belgium, especially 
chapters 9 and 10. Thus, the citations in this article will follow its original format 
instead of  the one published by SUNY in 2016. Originally, the title of  what was 
then a forthcoming book was From Love to Life?: Toward a Contemporary Phenomenology 
of  Religious Life but when it was fi nally published it was changed to Between Faith and 
Belief: Toward a Contemporary Phenomenology of  Life. Cf. Joeri Schrijvers, Between Faith 
and Belief: Toward a Contemporary Phenomenology of  Life (Albany, NY: State University 
of  New York, 2016).
20 When Gabriel Marcel wrote his “Metaphysical Journal” he did not know Martin 
Buber, despite the convergence between their ideas, because Marcel came from 
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an intellectual tradition, at that time, far removed from the German academic 
atmosphere. Emmanuel Levinas, Outside the Subject (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University, 1993) 20. The war deeply impacted Gabriel Marcel that it was during 
that tragic period that many of  Marcel’s important philosophical themes would take 
root. In fact, the journal that he kept during the war became the framework of  his 
fi rst book Metaphysical Journal (1927). Cf. Fieser and Dowden, “Gabriel Marcel.” 
In contrast to Marcel, Binswanger’s phenomenology of  love is heavily infl uenced 
by Martin Buber. In fact, it is also well known that Binswanger entered into a 
lifelong friendship with Buber who considered the issue intersubjectivity as central 
to his entire philosophy. In Schrijvers’ account it is mentioned that Binswanger’s 
monumental Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins was written in a time of  
war.
21 Cf. Simon Taylor, “Applied Philosophy, Applied Psychiatry: Ludwig Binswanger 
and the Birth of  Existential Analysis,” in New Practices of  Philosophy (New York: 
Columbia University, 2011) 3. Cf. also Frank Sulloway, Freud, Biologist of  the Mind: 
Beyond the Psychoanalytic Legend (New York: Harvard University, 1979).  Cf. also 
Ludwig Binswanger, “The Existential Analysis School of  Thought”, in Existence, 
trans. Ernest Angel, eds. Rollo May, Ernest Angel, & Henri Ellenberger (New York: 
Basic Books, 1958) 191. Ludwig Binswanger, “Heidegger’s Analytic of  Existence 
and Its Meaning for Psychiatry”, in Being-in-the-World: Selected Papers of  Ludwig 
Binswanger, trans. Jacob Needleman (New York: Basic Books, 1963) 211.
22 Cf. Roger Frie, Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity in Modern Philosophy and Psychoanalysis: 
A Study of  Sartre, Binswanger, Lacan, and Habermas (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefi eld, 
1997) 79. Brian Koehler, “Ludwig Binswanger: Contributions to an Intersubjective 
Approach to Psychosis (December 25, 2004)”, in International Society for Psychological 
and Social Approaches to Psychosis, United States Chapter, http://www.isps-us.org/
koehler/binswanger.htm [accessed: December 22, 2014]. Schrijvers explains that 
“Death, for Binswanger, undergoes a displacement: it no longer occupies the prime 
place as it does in Heidegger’s existential analytic receives its meaning as an ‘erotic 
phenomenon.’” Schrijvers, From Love to Life?, 374.
23 Cf. Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Charles Scribner’s 
Sons, 1971).
24 Schrijvers explains that Binswanger did not just criticize Heidegger’s Dasein but 
he also attempted “to extend Heideggers’s insights in Dasein’s relation with the 
world to the domain of  sick subjectivities or what he calls ‘misgűckten’, failed or false 
Dasein.” Schrijvers, From Love to Life?, 318. 
25 Binswanger, “The Existential Analysis,” 192.
26 Frie, Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity, 89, Frie noted that “[according] to Buber, the 
character of  a relation is determined by which of  the basic words is spoken: when 
I-Thou is said, the I is different from the I that speaks the primary word I-It.” 
He adds, “Binswanger follows Buber in arguing that human relations are by their 
essential nature dialogical (not simply referring to a linguistic mode, rather to a basic 
structure of  human existence - currently, this is being mapped in infant research 
by such theorists as Trevarthen in Scotland.” Frie, Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity, 89. 
See Colwyn Trevarthen “The Self  Born in Intersubjectivity: The Psychology of  an 
Infant Communicating” in The Perceived Self: Ecological and Interpersonal Sources of  self-
Knowledge, ed. Ulric Neisser (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1993).
27 Frie, Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity, 106.
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28 Ludwig Binswanger, “On the manic mode of  being-in-the-world,” in Phenomenology: 
Pure and Applied, ed. Erwin W. Straus (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University,1964) 134.
29 According to Giovanni Stranghellini, “Jasper’s incomprehensibility is the effect of  
de-personalized understanding.” Cf. Giovanni Stranghellini, Disembodied Spirits and 
Deanimated Bodies: The Psychopathology of  Common Sense (England: Oxford University, 
2004) 29.
30 The I and thou relationship is not similar but a contrast to the subject-object 
relationship. For Binswanger, the mutual relationship of  love, the dual mode of  
love, constitutes the most original and ‘highest’ form of  human existence.
31 Binswanger, Being-in-the-World, 177.
32  Binswanger, “The Existential Analysis,” 193-94. Binswanger further states: “the 
much-discussed gap that separates our ‘world’ from the ‘world’ of  the mentally ill 
and makes communication between the two so diffi cult is not only scientifi cally 
explained but also scientifi cally bridged by existential analysis.” Binswanger, “The 
Existential Analysis,”, 213.
33 Taylor, “Applied Philosophy, Applied Psychiatry,” 7. Cf  also Ludwig Binswanger, 
Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins (Heidelberg: Roland Asanger, 2004) 
69, 134. Binswanger, Being-in-the-World, 337-338. Binswanger, “Existential Analysis 
“, 82.
34 Binswanger, “The Existential Analysis,” 194.
35 In Marcel’s understanding, “love does not deny death, but is it affi rmation of  the 
fact that death is not the end, because death does not close of  the other and the 
end of  one’s love to the departed one. Marcel believes that “the only dead are 
those whom we no longer love”. Gabriel Marcel, Presence and Immortality, trans. M.A. 
Machado (Pittsburg, PA: Duquesne University, 1967) 277.
36 Schrijvers, From Love to Life?, 337. According to Schrijvers, “The horror of  death…
differs in a remarkable way from other interruptions of  love, such as infi delity, for 
if  in such suspensions the love of  lovers comes, more often than not, to a halt, the 
death of  one of  the lovers does not mean the end of  the loving ‘we’.” Schrijvers, 
From Love to Life?, 374. 
37 Schrijvers, From Love to Life?, 317. See also Ludwig Binswanger , ‘Brief  von 
Binswanger and Richard Hönigswald, 6 February 1947,” in Vorträge und Aufsätze, ed. 
M. Herzog, Ausgwählte Werke (Heidelberg: Asanger, 1994) 316.
38 Schrijvers, From Love to Life?, 318. For an extended discussion on Binswanger 
phenomenology of  love, please refer to pp. 328- 338.
39 Cf. Marcel, Metaphysical Journal, 139, 137. Please see Gabriel Marcel, The Existential 
Background of  Human Dignity (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1963) 41. For 
Binswanger’s notion of  concreteness please see Rollo May and Irvin Yalom, 
“Existential Psychology,” in Current Psychotherapies, eds. Raymond Corsini and Danny 
Wedding (Itasca, IL: Peacock 1989) 366.
40 Marcel, Le Mystere de l’ Etre, 41. This philosophy is a sort of  “description bearing 
upon the structures which refl ection elucidates starting from experience.” 
Marcel, Man Against Mass Society, 180. Marcel expressed a refreshing preference 
for philosophizing in ordinary language. He maintained that “we should employ 
current forms of  ordinary language which distort our experiences far less than the 
elaborate expressions in which philosophical language is crystallized” Marcel, Homo 
Viator, 158. Despite the fact that he does not label his brand of  philosophy as a 
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phenomenology, which Binswanger openly endorses, Marcel’s approach traverses 
the same stream as Binswanger, because his preference for the concrete philosophy 
that speaks in ordinary language allows him to begin many of  his philosophical 
essays with an observation about life and experience.
41 In a thesis submitted to the Faculty of  Episcopal Theological School, Richard Rowe 
introduced Daseinsanalysis in the following words: “Daseinsanalyse is the peculiar 
creation of  Ludwig Binswanger. Binswanger borrowed Dasein [Being (Sein) there 
(Da)] from the existential philosophy of  Martin Heidegger. To this concept he 
added a neo-Freudian psycho-‘analysis’… Daseinsanalyse was Binswanger’s attempt 
to complement and broaden the view of  man and his experience of  living which 
was implicit in Freudian psychoanalysis. The experience which Binswanger wanted 
to introduce into psychiatry (and which Freud said must not be included) is the 
experience of  transcendence, that is, the feeling of  spirit, or love.” Richard Rowe, 
“The Daseinsanalyse of  Ludwig Binswanger and the Biblical Concept of  Agape: 
A Treatise on the Creative Power of  Love in Psychotherapy” (unpublished thesis, 
Faculty of  Episcopal Theological School, Cambridge, MA, 1966) IV-V.
42 Marcel, Le Mystere de l’ Etre, 41. According to Schrijvers, “Binswanger… is much 
more aware of  the back and forth of  the ontic and the ontological, and considers 
the former as the only legitimate passage-way to the latter without one being able to 
dismiss the former completely.” Schrijvers, From Love to Life?, 339.
43 Marcel, Creative Fidelity, 65;
44 Marcel, The Existential Background, 82-83.
45 Ibid., 26.
46 Deurzen-Smith, Everyday Mysteries, 147. Deurzen-Smith is an existential 
psychotherapist at Regent’s College in London and someone who is responsible for 
the contemporary resurgence of  this approach in the London school of  existential 
analysis. 
47 “I should like to start,” Marcel says, “with a sort of  global and intuitive 
characterization of  the man in whom the sense of  the ontological—the sense of  
being, is lacking, or, to speak more correctly, the man who has lost awareness of  
this sense.” A world in which “ontological exigence”—if  it is acknowledged at all—is 
silenced by an unconscious relativism or by a monism that discounts the personal, 
“ignores the tragic and denies the transcendent.” Gabriel Marcel, The Philosophy of  
Existentialism, trans. Manya Harari (New York: Carol, 1995) 9, 15.
48 Gabriel Marcel, Tragic Wisdom and Beyond (with conversations between Paul Riceour and 
Gabriel Marcel), trans. Stephen Jolin and Peter McCormick (Evanston: Northwestern 
University, 1973) 44.
49 Bernd Becher, Hilla Becher and Thuerry de Duve, Grundformen, vol. 40 of  Schirmer’s 
visuelle Bibliothek (n.p.: Schirmer/Mosel, 1993) 107, “schaut Desin […] sich als 
Mitdasein an”. Cf. S chrijvers, From Love to Life?, 341. 
50 Schrijvers, From Love to Life?, 341. 
51 Ibid..
52 Marcel states: “Love is faith itself, an invincible assurance based on Being itself. It 
is here and her alone that we reach not only an unconditioned fact but a rational 
unconditional as well; namely that of  the Absolute Thou, that which is expressed in 
the Fiat voluntas tua of  the Lord’s Prayer.” Marcel, “Les Menace de Guerre,” 136.
53 Marcel, Gabriel Being and Having (New York: Harper & Row, 1949) 79.
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54 Transcendence for Marcel is understood as “trans-ascendence”. He insists that 
‘transcendent’ cannot mean ‘transcending experience.’ Cf. Marcel, Le Mystere de l’ 
Etre, 46.
55 Marcel, Man Against Mass Society, 259.
56 Donald McCarthy, “Marcel’s Absolute Thou,” Philosophy Today 10(1966): 178.
57 Schrijvers, From Love to Life?, 341-342. Schrijvers explains that “The meeting of  
lovers is the crossing between (ontic) encounter and the (ontological) Urbegegnung, 
between our together (Wir beide) and togetherness in general (überhaupt) or … it 
is my being drawn to you because of  the universal enticement that rages through 
being and presences between all beings.” Schrijvers, From Love to Life?, 340.
58 According to Joeri Schrijvers, Binswanger did so because of  the climate of  the 
period. Schrijvers, From Love to Life?,
59 Schrijvers, From Love to Life?, 346.
60 According to Dionisio Miranda, “Loob is a Filipino term rich in many meanings, 
as found in its various cognates or derivatives. Consider, for example, these terms: 
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